This article is a rebuttal to Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti’s article, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: Problems with Craig’s Inference to the Best Explanation,” which argues that the Standard Model of current particle physics entails that non-physical things (like a supernatural God or a supernaturally resurrected body) can have no causal contact with the physical universe. As such, they argue that William Lane Craig’s resurrection hypothesis is not only incompatible with the notion of Jesus physically appearing to the (...) disciples, but the resurrection hypothesis is significantly limited in both its explanatory scope and explanatory power. This article seeks to demonstrate why their use of the Standard Model does not logically entail a rejection of the physical resurrection of Jesus when considering the scope and limitations of science itself. (shrink)

Philosopher Davis argues that Christian belief in the resurrection is rational on historical, philosophical, and theological grounds. Each of the book's ten chapters takes up a different aspect of the Christian concept of bodily resurrection and subsequently deals with such matters as perservation of personal identity and soul-body dualism, issues in biblical scholarship, and the reliability of New Testament accounts.

How do we prove the existence of God? This book tackles head-on this fundamental question. It examines a cross-section of theistic proofs, explaining in clear terms what they are and what they try to accomplish.

Recently a new question has emerged in the philosophy of religion: not whether God exists, but whether God’s existence is or would be preferable. The existing literature on the subject is sparse (see, for example, footnotes 2, 3, 4, and 5). The present essay, in dialogue form, is an attempt to marshal and evaluate arguments on both sides.

Recently, in this journal, Jeremy Gwiazda has offered a critique of our separationist view of hell. His objection relies on two key assumptions, and we show in our reply that both assumptions can be denied.

Let’s call “Cartesian omnipotence” the view that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs at all, even logically impossible ones. The present paper explores what can be said in support of CO. It turns out that several powerful and interesting arguments can be given in its defense, although in the end, along with the vast majority of philosophers of religion, I reject it.

Christians traditionally hold that we know God as God is revealed to us, but that we do not know God in essence, as God is in himself. But that raises the question of whether God as revealed accurately represents God’s essence. Perhaps, given our cognitive limitations, God logically cannot reveal the divine essence to us. Or perhaps God knows that it would not be good for us were he to do so. Descartes raised the possibility that God is an Evil (...) Genius who systematically misleads us. This paper explores several attempts to build a bridge from GR to GE. All appear to have serious limitations. It concludes that, contrary to much of the tradition, GR does reveal God’s essence to us. (shrink)

Theists typically believe the following two propositions: God is omniscient, and Human beings are free. Are they consistent? In order to decide, we must first ask what they mean. Roughly, let us say that a being is omniscient if for any proposition he knows whether it is true or false. Since I have no wish to deny that there are true and false propositions about future states of affairs, omniscience includes foreknowledge, which we can say is knowledge of the truth (...) value of propositions about future states of affairs. For example, I believe the proposition ‘Davis will wear shoes tomorrow’ is true today, and if it is true today, i.e. if I will wear shoes tomorrow, an omniscient being knows today that it is true – and, if this being is eternally omniscient, he knew it millions of years ago. (shrink)

Let me begin with a true story. Years ago, early in my career as a professor of philosophy, I had a fascinating series of conversations with a student whom I will call Peter. He was a bright and incisive senior, with a double major in philosophy and psychology. Raised in a religious family, the son of a Christian minister, he was himself unable to believe. His doubts were too strong. But the odd fact was that he genuinely wanted to believe. (...) His religious scepticism deeply troubled him; part of him envied the faith of his parents. How do you go about making yourself believe?, he asked me. How do you go about having the kinds of religious experiences that lead people to faith? These were long and intense conversations, and I was unable to move Peter away from his doubts. So far as I know he is still a sceptic. (shrink)

This article considers the concepts of revelation and inspiration. The two notions are distinct but closely connected in Christian theology; they come together preeminently in discussions of the Bible. The purpose of revelation is to bring it about that humans come into a personal relationship with God, one that involves freely chosen love as well as worship and obedience. Inspiration is that influence of the Holy Spirit on the writing of the Bible which ensures that the words of its various (...) texts are appropriate both for the role which they play in Scripture and for the overall salvific purpose of Scripture itself. In other words, working in conjunction with the human author, God ensures that the words written are revelatory and fit God's purposes. Because of inspiration, God speaks to us in the Bible. Scripture is not just a record of revelation; it in itself is revelatory. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.

This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, (...) this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered. (shrink)

Although not a believer in the doctrine of divine simplicity, in the present paper I do not argue that it is incoherent or even false. I instead ague that it is unnecessary to protect what Christians want to say about God. It seems to me that three main considerations motivate the doctrine. First, if there is any complexity in God, there must also be potentiality in God, which is unacceptable. Second, the doctrine is designed to ensure logical consistency with other (...) things classical Christians want to say about God. Third, the doctrine is designed to protect the divine transcendence over all of creation. I argue against these three points. (shrink)

This essay is a response to Michael Martin’s “Why the Resurrection Is Initially Improbable,” Philo, Vol. 1, No.1. I argue that Martin has not succeeded in achieving his aim of showing that the Resurrection is initially improbable and thus, by Bayes’s Theorem, implausible. I respond to five of Martin’s arguments: (1) the “particular time and place argument”; (2) the claim that there is no plausible Christian theory of why Jesus should have been incarnated and resurrected; (3) the claim that the (...) Resurrection accounts in the New Testament are unreliable; (4) Martin’s assumptions about how one establishes the initial probability of Resurrection; and (5) the use Martin makes of Bayes’s Theorem to discredit belief in the Resurrection. (shrink)

The present paper is a rejoinder to Michael Martin’s “Reply to Davis” (Philo vol. 2, no. 1), which was a response to my “Is Belief in theResurrection Rational? A Response to Michael Martin” (ibid.), which was itself a response to Martin’s “Why the Resurrection is Initially Improbable” (Philo vol. 1, no. 1), which in turn was a critique of various of my own writings on resurrection, especially Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection.

Social Trinitarianism is a family of views that bear some resemblance to each other in a way that distinguishes them from other Trinitarian accounts. In this paper, we address recent objections by Carl Mosser against ST, objections which have not received much attention by defenders of ST. Mosser claims that proponents of ST offer a narrative that is historically inaccurate, employs concepts of personhood and perichoresis that are incompatible, upholds dubious hermeneutical assumptions, and is unable to preclude Mormon theology within (...) its fold. We argue that all four criticisms fail, especially for a specific version of ST: Perichoretic Monotheism. (shrink)

Human beings face two great problems: guilt and death. Although disembodied existence is in some sense possible, it would be an attenuated existence since we are normally embodied beings, and complete and ideal existence for us is embodied. Matter is not evil because it was created by God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good. We are redeemed from guilt and death by the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. Despite Catholic and Protestant differences at this point, Christians largely agree (...) that we are justified by faith in Christ. Two different scenarios for the general resurrection are discussed, as well as the beatific vision. (shrink)

The present paper is a response to, and critique of, Dale Allison’s recent book, Resurrecting Jesus. While deeply appreciative of much of the book, I try to assuage Allison’s doubts and worries about the traditional claim that Jesus was bodily raised. Accordingly, in the present brief paper, I briefly explain and try to solve three difficulties that Allison raises in this area. The first concerns personal identity; the second concerns differences between Jesus’s resurrection and our resurrections; and the third concerns (...) Allison’s doubts that our future existence will be embodied. (shrink)

The present essay is a response to Keith Ward’s recent book, Christ and the Cosmos. While deeply appreciative of this fine book, I raise two criticisms of it: Ward’s claim that we can know nothing of the divine essence has disturbing implications, the main one of which is that there may be large disjunctions between what God has revealed to us about the divine nature and the divine nature in itself. Ward’s criticisms of the social theory of the Trinity are (...) not compelling and indeed edge his own view close to modalism. (shrink)

Christian Philosophical Theology constitutes a Christian philosopher's look at various crucial topics in Christian theology, including belief in God, the nature of God, the Trinity, christology, the resurrection of Jesus, the general resurrection, redemption, and theological method. The book is tightly argued, and amounts to a coherent explanation of and case for the Christian world view. While the work is written from a broadly Reformed Protestant perspective and the author does not avoid controversial topics, the aim is to present a (...) 'merely Christian' world view (to adapt slightly C. S. Lewis's famous term). That is, Stephen T. Davis attempts to write as much as possible from the perspective of the broad centre of Christian understanding. (shrink)

Intended as a useful, instructive resource for believers and unbelievers alike, Disputed Issues is essential to understanding what a thoughtful orthodox Christian believes--and why.